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Ameritech Corp. v. United States,
867 F. SuPP. 721 (N.D. ILL. 1994).
INTRODUCTION

Ameritech Corporation ("Ameritech"), a regional telephone company, joined
by local telephone company Illinois Bell, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, against the federal government,
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), and the United States Attorney General (collectively "the Government"). The plaintiffs challenged a provision of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, which prohibits telephone companies from providing cable television service directly to customers
within the companies' local service area. Both parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs holding that the challenged provision infringed upon the companies'
right of free speech under the First Amendment.
FACTS

Plaintiff Ameritech is the parent company of plaintiffs Illinois Bell and Michigan Bell. The three companies provide local and regional telephone service to
millions of customers. In 1970, the FCC, concerned that a monopoly situation
might arise, issued a ruling which prohibited telephone companies from providing cable television programming to customers in their local service area. The
1970 FCC rule was codified by Congress in section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the "1984 Cable Act").' The Act specifically prohibits telephone companies from providing "video programming," which is defined as "programming provided by, or generally considered comparable to programming provided by, a television broadcast station."2 Although section 533(b)
of the Act does not bar telephone companies from providing either video programming to customers outside their local service areas or other visual informa-

1. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(1) and (2)(1994), which provides:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier... to provide video programming directly to subscribers in its telephone service area, either directly or indirectly through an affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with the common
carrier. (2) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier... to provide channels of communication or pole line conduit space, or other rental arrangements, to any entity which is
directly or indirectly owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with
such common carrier, if such facilities or arrangements are to be used for, or in connection
with, the provision of video programming directly to subscribers in the telephone service
area of the common carrier.
2. 47 U.S.C. § 522(19) (1994).
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tion services not considered "video programming," the plaintiffs contended that
section 533(b) was an impermissible restriction on speech in violation of the
First Amendment.
Concern has been growing in recent years about monopolistic practices within
the cable television industry. Most cable television systems face no local competition; consequently, most subscribers have no opportunity to choose between
competing cable systems. Congress attempted to address these concerns by enacting the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992 (the "1992 Cable
Act"), over a presidential veto. The 1992 Cable Act prohibits exclusive local
franchises, regulates or limits the rates cable providers may charge their customers, and prohibits cable providers from owning "wireless" cable systems.3 During the debate preceding the enactment of the 1992 Cable Act, the FCC and the
United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") supported allowing telephone companies to compete in the cable marketplace. Nevertheless, the 1992 Cable Act
left section 533(b) intact, and the local cable market remained closed to telephone companies.
The plaintiffs alleged that although section 533(b) may have served the
Government's asserted interests ten years ago, the asserted interests are no longer
served by the statute, thereby infringing upon the plaintiffs' First Amendment
rights. The Government argued that section 533(b) furthers a legitimate governmental interest and is, therefore, constitutional. Both parties moved for summary
judgment.
LEGAL ANALYSIS

Since both parties agreed that section 533(b) of the 1984 Cable Act constitutes a restriction on the plaintiffs' speech, the district court first had to determine the proper level of scrutiny under which section 533(b) should be analyzed.
In cases involving restrictions on speech, courts have applied three levels of
scrutiny. Using the "rational basis" standard, the least rigorous test, courts uphold
regulations affecting broadcast television if the regulations are "'a reasonable
means' of promoting a 'permissible' public interest."4 When the government
seeks to regulate the time, place or manner of speech, or governmental regulation
of conduct has an incidental effect on speech, courts apply an "intermediate" or
"heightened" scrutiny analysis.5 "Content-based" restrictions on speech are presumed invalid and will be upheld only if "necessary to serve a compelling state
interest." These types of restrictions merit the highest level of scrutiny, known
as "strict scrutiny."
Although the parties to this action agreed that section 533(b) of the 1984
Cable Act imposes restrictions on the telephone companies' freedom of speech,
they disagreed as to which level of scrutiny should be applied. The Government

3.
4.
5.
6.

See 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(c), 533(a)(2), 533(f), 543 (1994).
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978).
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 403 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
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urged the court to apply the "rational basis" standard of review traditionally used
in cases involving over-the-air broadcasting regulations. The plaintiffs argued
that section 533(b) should be subject to strict scrutiny because it is content-based
and discriminates against a discrete group of speakers, i.e., telephone companies.
The court rejected the arguments of both parties, favoring instead the intermediate scrutiny approach used by the United States Supreme Court in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.7 In Turner Broadcasting,the Supreme Court
found the "must-carry" provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, which require cable
companies to include local television stations on their cable systems, constitutional.' The Turner court, in applying intermediate scrutiny, reasoned that while
broadcasting restrictions on traditional over-the-air broadcasters might appropriately be subject to rational basis review due to the broadcast spectrum's scarcity
of frequencies, such considerations do not apply to cable television, because
there is "no practical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the
cable medium." 9 The district court in the instant case ruled that just as the 1992
Cable Act's "must-carry" provisions placed a special burden on cable operators,
section 533(b) likewise burdens telephone companies by barring them from providing video programming to their customers, therefore, intermediate scrutiny is
the appropriate standard.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that section 533(b) is a content-based
restriction requiring strict scrutiny. The plaintiffs argued that the distinction in
section 533(b) between video programming and other types of video service that
telephone companies are allowed to carry is content-based. In determining
whether or not a restriction is content-based, a court must look to whether the
restriction favors some speech over other speech on the basis of the ideas or
views expressed."0 The court stated that it could not see how ideas or views fit
into the distinction between the forbidden video programming and the permissible interactive programming. The court reasoned that the provision prohibits any
video programming regardless of content and is, therefore, content-neutral. The
plaintiffs' alternative argument that section 533(b) should trigger a strict scrutiny
analysis because it targets a small number of speakers was also rejected by the
court, which held that fact by itself was insufficient to justify strict scrutiny.
The court next addressed the issue of whether section 533(b) would pass
constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny analysis. Under intermediate
scrutiny, the restriction may be upheld if it satisfies a three-part test: (1) it is
content-neutral; (2) it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest; and (3) it leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information."
Having already determined that section 533(b) is content-neutral, the court

7. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2473.
10. Id.
11. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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next considered whether the statute was narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest. Narrow tailoring requires only that the regulation promote
a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively without
the regulation. 2 Although the government need not use the least speech-restrictive means to advance its interest, the means chosen cannot be more speechrestrictive than is necessary. 3 The court also stressed the importance of evaluating the statute with reference to conditions as they exist today. When the constitutionality of a statute is based upon a particular set of facts, that constitutionality "may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to
exist." 4 The court reasoned that although section 533(b) may have passed constitutional muster at the time it was enacted, a change in market conditions since
that time may have rendered the statute a greater burden than necessary to promote the goals of competitiveness and diversity of ownership in the business of
cable television.
The court considered the key issue in the case to be whether section 533(b)
placed a greater than necessary burden on protected speech. The court noted that
the FCC and DOJ, two federal agencies responsible for formulating telecommunications and antitrust policies, agreed that section 533(b) does not promote
competition and diversity in the cable industry, and that the statute may actually
be counterproductive. Citing a lack of convincing evidence that other current
methods of regulating anti-competitive behavior would be ineffective, the court
held that the Government had not met its burden of showing that the statute was
narrowly tailored to promote competition and diversity of ownership in cable
television. Accordingly, the court found that section 533(b) imposed a greater
than necessary burden on the telephone companies' speech, and the second prong
of the three-part intermediate scrutiny analysis was not met.
Although the court need not have addressed the third part of the intermediate
scrutiny analysis, i.e., whether the statute leaves open ample alternative channels
of communication, it nevertheless did. The Government argued that the plaintiffs
were free to provide video programming to customers outside their local service
areas or alternatively through independent media outlets. The plaintiffs countered,
and the court agreed, that the Government's reasoning on this issue "is akin to
telling the Chicago Tribune that it may distribute a newspaper everywhere but in
Chicago, or that its ability to communicate is not significantly curtailed by its
having to publish its news stories in other publications."' 5 For the foregoing
reasons, the court granted the summary judgment motion in favor of the plaintiffs.

12. Turner Broadcasting,114 S. Ct. at 2469; Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
13. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799-800.
14. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938)(citing Chastleton Corp. v.
Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924)).
15. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721, 736 (N.D. nIl. 1994).
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CONCLUSION

In summary, the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 provision which
prohibits telephone companies from providing cable television programming
directly to customers within their local service area does not pass constitutional
muster under the First Amendment. In applying the intermediate standard of
review, the court found that the Government had failed to meet its burden of
showing that the statute was narrowly tailored to promote competition and diversity of ownership in cable television. Consequently, the court found that the
challenged statute infringed on the plaintiffs' First Amendment right of free
speech. The plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and declaratory judgment
were granted, and the defendants were permanently enjoined from enforcing
section 533(b) against the plaintiff telephone companies in their respective service areas.
Radoje A. Vujovic
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